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Statutory Overreach:
A Critique of the Fourth Circuit's Expansive
Construction of the
Immigration Fraud Statute
Zac Flowerreet

Section 1546(a) [the immigration fraud statute] is certainly not a model of good draftsmanship;a better description
would be that it is a masterpiece of obfuscation. Indeed,
with this section, Congress has achieved in a single 124word sentence a level of confusion it usually takes pages to
create.
Judge O'Scannlain1
INTRODUCTION

The path to legal employment-based residency in the United
States is paved with red tape. 2 Lawyers can assist aliens in
successfully traversing this path, but lawyers must not do so by
removing the inhibiting pieces of regulatory tape. Some lawyers,
however, have made a business of detaching this tape. Instead of
working on behalf of an alien's required sponsoring United
States employer, they work directly for an alien client.3 These
lawyers allow their alien clients to sidestep the congressionally
mandated immigration regulatory scheme, while helping their
clients to obtain the same authentic Green Cards as are available to aliens that pursue the legal route to residency. An immigration fraud statute criminalizes the fraudulent manufacturing
t BA 2007, University of South Florida; JD Candidate 2011, The University of
Chicago Law School.
1 United States v Kristic, 558 F3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir 2009) (quotations and citations omitted).
2 Section L.A of this Comment details the regulations governing the Green Card
application process.
3 In violation of 20 CFR § 656.10(a)-(b).
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of Green Cards or other immigration-related entry documents,
yet this same statute is less clear with respect to immigrationrelated application misconduct. 4 Currently, there is a split in authority between the Fourth and Tenth Circuits over whether the
immigration fraud statute reaches such lawyerly misconduct.5
This Comment explores this split in authority, and proposes
several arguments in favor of the Tenth Circuit's reading of the
statute.
A.

Background: The Green Card Application Process

To obtain legal employment in the United States, alien
workers must complete a three-step application process. 6 First,
the alien's prospective employer must obtain a Labor Certification from the Department of Labor. 7 The Department of Labor
issues Labor Certifications through its Employment Training
Administration agency.8 To petition for a Labor Certification, the
alien's prospective employer, or an attorney acting on the employer's behalf, must file an Application for Alien Employment
(Form ETA-750) with the Employment Training Administration. 9
The Employment Training Administration only issues the Labor
Certification if it establishes that (1) there are an insufficient
number of United States workers willing, able, and qualified to
perform the job, and (2) employment of the petitioning alien will
not adversely affect the working conditions or wages of similarly
situated workers in the United States.1"
After obtaining a Labor Certification, the employer files a
Visa Petition for Prospective Immigrant Employment (Form
1-140) with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service.1 1
This Visa Petition amounts to a request to the Bureau of
Citizenship for the alien to be designated eligible for one of the

4 For purposes of this Comment, these statutes are the four unnumbered paragraphs

of 18 USC § 1546(a).
5 See United States v Ryan- Webster, 353 F3d 353, 363 (4th Cir 2003); United States v
Phillips,543 F3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir 2008).
6 Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 355.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id at 356.
10 See 8 USC § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i).
11 Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 356.
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relevant employment categories. 12 If Form 1-140 is approved, the
13
applicant receives an immigrant visa number.
The third step of the alien's prospective employment process
14
differs for resident alien applicants and nonresident applicants.
If the applicant is a resident, the employer files an Application to
Adjust Status (Form 1-485), commonly known as the Green Card
Application. 15 If approved, the applicant becomes a lawful per6
manent resident entitled to live and work in the United States.
If the applicant is a nonresident, the alien must complete an
immigrant visa application.' 7 If approved, the applicant receives
a Green Card and can then enter, work, and remain in the
8
United States.'
B.

How the Economic
Immigration Fraud

Downturn Increased

Incentives for

The effects of the recession in the United States have been
more acutely felt by Mexicans and other Latin Americans than
by United States residents. In 2009, Mexico's economy contracted
6.8 percent, the greatest economic decline in that country in the
last thirty years.' 9 Eighty percent of Mexico's exports go to the
United States. 20 As might be expected, when the economies of
Mexico and other Latin American countries rely so heavily on US
demand for imports, the decline in US demand is inevitably felt
21
abroad.
Immigration data suggests that the economic contraction led
to an increase in legal rather than illegal immigration on the
southern United States border. 22 After efforts to enact com12 Id at 356.

13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 356.
16 8 USC § 1255(a).
17 See 8 USC § 1181(a).
18 Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 356.
19 See Mexico GDP Down 6.8% in 2009, ABC News (Jan 30, 2010), online at
http/abcnews.go.con/Business/wireStory?id=9705435 (visited Oct 3, 2010).
20

Id.

21 See generally M. Angeles Villarreal, U.S. Mexico Economic Relations: Trends,
Issues, and Implications (Congressional Research Service March 31, 2010), online at
http/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R"2934.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010); see also Alvaro VargasLlosa, Latin America and the World Recession 3 J of Globalization, Competitiveness &
Governability 20, 21 (2009), online at http/gcg.universia.net/pdfsjrevistas/articulo_
117_1238082727472.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010).
22 See Steven Camarota and Karen Jensenius, Homeward Bound: Recent
Immigration Enforcement and the Decline in the Illegal Alien Population (Center for
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prehensive immigration reform failed in June of 2007, the
Department of Homeland Security strengthened border protec23
tion and cracked down on businesses employing illegal workers.
Steve Malanga, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, observed that if illegal workers leave their jobs because of increased enforcement of immigration laws, new positions should
open for legal foreign workers. 24 Confirming this prediction, from
May 2007 until August 2008, the illegal immigrant population in
the United States decreased by 11 percent; during the same
25
period, the number of legal immigrants continued to grow.
At the same time, the incentive remained to obtain Green
Cards through forged application documents. To legally obtain a
Green Card, an alien worker must find a US employer to sponsor
the alien's immigration application. However, the alien worker
might not know where to find a US employer willing to sponsor
his or her application. As a result, this requirement of the application process alone may remove the legal option for many potential immigrants. In response to the demand from potential immigrants, American lawyers have all-too-readily applied their
knowledge to thwart the legal immigration process. As discussed
in this Comment, American lawyers risked imprisonment to
meet the demand from immigrants to provide fraudulent immigration services.
I. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

The Fourth Circuit's Foundational Analysis of the § 1546(a)
Interpretive Problem

Sylvia Ryan-Webster developed a legal practice focused on
enabling alien workers to obtain Green Cards. 26 After engaging
an alien client, Ryan-Webster would file an Attorney Appearance
Notice with the Employment Training Administration. 27 In this
notice, Ryan-Webster would falsely claim to represent an actual
United States employer. 28 In the course of this fictitious repreImmigration Studies July 2008), online at httpV/www.cis.org/articles/200/back808.pdf
(visited Oct 3, 2010).
23 Gail Russel Chaddock, Tide of Illegal Immigrants Now Being Reversed, Christian
Science Monitor 1-2 (July 31, 2008).
24 Id.

25 See Camarota and Jensenius, Homeward Bound (cited in note 22).
26 Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 356.
27 Id at 357.
28 Id.
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sentation, Ryan-Webster would forge all necessary employer signatures to make it possible to obtain Green Cards for her alien
clients. 29 Ryan-Webster would charge her alien clients seven
thousand dollars to complete this fabricated application process. 30 While it lasted, Ryan-Webster's immigration law practice
31
was a booming economic success.
Upon discovering the scheme, prosecutors charged RyanWebster with violating 18 USC § 371 and 18 USC § 1546(a). The
first paragraph of § 1546(a) provides:
Whoever knowingly... utters, uses... [or] possesses...
any such visa, permit, border crossing card, alien
registration receipt card, or other document prescribed by
statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made
[is guilty of a felony].32
In particular, Ryan-Webster was charged with possessing documents "prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into, or as
evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States"
33
which she "knew to be forged and falsely made."
In challenging her conviction under § 1546(a), Ryan-Webster
argued that Certification Applications and Visa Petitions did not
amount to documents "prescribed by statute or regulation for
entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the
United States." 34 In analyzing this contention, the appellate
court began by examining the plain language of the statute. 35
The court held that Ryan-Webster's conduct fell within the ambit
of § 1546(a). 36 The court reasoned that an alien can only obtain
entry into the United States with a "valid unexpired immigrant
visa," and that the Department of Labor can only issue such a
visa if it first issues a Labor Certification and approves a Visa
37
Application.

29 Id.
30 Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 357.

Id.
18 USC § 1546(a).
Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 357.
Id at 358.
Id at 360.
36 Id.
37 Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 361.
31

32
33
34
35
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The Ryan- Webster court chose an expansive interpretation of
the provision: "document prescribed by statute or regulation for
entry." The court recognized that only a Green Card has the ultimate power to gain an alien legal entry into the United States.
But, according to the court, an alien cannot receive that Green
Card without successfully completing the three-step application
process (described in Section I.A of this Comment). Even though
an alien cannot obtain entry into the United States by presenting
a completed immigration application document at the border,
those same application documents are prescribed by statute for
an alien that desires to gain entry into the United States.
In response to the court's reading, Ryan-Webster argued
that immigration application documents alone are insufficient
to obtain entry into the United States. 38 The court accepted the
accuracy of the defendant's contention, but held that such a
fact need not remove application documents from the ambit of
§ 1546(a). 39 Instead, the court reasoned that application
documents could be insufficient to authorize entry while remaining "plainly prescribed by law as prerequisites" to such entry
40
documents.
The Ryan-Webster court concluded that such unambiguous
statutory language controls unless Congress has expressed a
clear contrary intent. 41 Far from contravening the clear statutory
language, the court found that congressional intent corroborated
this interpretation. 42 The court's legislative intent analysis
hinged on an amendment to § 1546(a) that was designed to overturn a Supreme Court decision interpreting the statute. In 1971,
the Supreme Court evaluated the predecessor statute to
§ 1546(a) and found that an Alien Registration Receipt Card did
not count as a "document required for entry into the United
States."43 Instead, the Court found that the essential purpose of
such a Receipt Card was to "identify the bearer as a lawfully
registered alien residing in the United States."44 Regarding the
language of § 1546(a), the Court held that it "denote[d] a very

38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.

41
42
43
44

Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 362.
Id at 362-63.
United States v Compos-Serrano,404 US 293, 295 (1971).
Id at 299-300.
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special class of 'entry' documents-documents whose primary
45
raisond'etre is the facilitation of entry into the country."
In response to the Court's decision, Congress amended
§ 1546(a). In addition to listing Alien Registration Receipt Cards
in the enumerated examples of relevant "entry" documents, the
amendment also replaced "required for entry" with "document
prescribed by statute or regulation for entry." In the legislative
history of this amendment, Congress expressed an intent to expand the types of documents covered by § 1546(a). 46 A later court
applying this amended statute, the Fifth Circuit in United States
v Osiemi,47 explained that possession of a counterfeited foreign
passport violated § 1546(a) even though a foreign passport was
48
not strictly "required" for entry.
The dissenter in Ryan- Webster, Judge Williams, argued that
a contextual reading of § 1546(a) contradicted the interpretation
taken by the majority. 49 Judge Williams applied two canons of
statutory interpretation in analyzing the meaning of the text.
First, he applied ejusdem generis, which holds that when a
general phrase in a statute follows a list of particular examples,
courts should interpret that general phrase in a manner consistent with the common attributes of the particular examples. 50
In § 1546(a), the general phrase "other document" follows just
such a specific list of examples-i.e. "visa, permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt card." The dissenter found
that each of the enumerated documents had "some independent
evidentiary significance respecting the legality of the bearer's
entry into or stay in the country." 51 For example, either a visa or
a worker's permit allows the owner of that document to legally
enter the United States.
In addition to the entrance-efficacy of the documents in the
enumerated examples, these documents are also prepared by a
governmental agency. 52 In contrast, application documents are
prepared by the alien's prospective employer or his employer's
45

Id at 299.

46 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, HR Rep No 99-682(L), 99th Cong,
2d Sess 94 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5698; Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1985, S Rep No 99-132, at 31 (1985).
47 980 F2d 344 (5th Cir 1993)
48 Id at 346 (finding that a foreign passport was one type of document an alien could,
but was not required to, use to enter the country).
49 Ryan- Webster, 353 F3d at 365-67.

50 Id.
51 Id at 366.
52 Id.
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representing attorney. 53 Moreover, a visa or worker's permit is
created and issued by the government in satisfaction of the
alien's successful completion of the immigration application process.5 4 In light of the shared attributes of the enumerated examples, interpreting "other document" to include application materials is plainly inconsistent with the canon of ejusdem generis.
Judge Williams applied a second canon of construction, the
55
rule against superfluity, to support his reading of the statute.
Section 1546(a) contains four unnumbered paragraphs.5 6 The
above analysis all took place in the context of paragraph one.
Paragraph four, however, speaks more specifically to misrepresentations in an alien's application documents: "[persons
shall not] knowingly make[ ] under oath... any false statement
with respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit, or
other document required by the immigration laws or regulations
prescribed thereunder."5 7 Hence, Judge Williams concluded that
the majority's interpretation of paragraph one renders the word
"application" in paragraph four entirely superfluous. 58 The fourth
paragraph is unnecessary to successfully prosecute application
forgeries if "other document" in paragraph one criminalizes such
59
forgeries.
The majority's response to Judge Williams on this argument
was to distinguish between paragraph one's prohibition against
forgeries and paragraph four's proscription against "false statements."60 Judge Williams countered by identifying paragraph
61
one's additional proscription against "falsely made" statements.
He contended that there was no material distinction between
statements "falsely made" in paragraph one and "false statements" in paragraph four, regardless of whether or not para62
graph one also criminalizes forgeries.
In response, the majority did not present any examples of
application-related misconduct covered by paragraph four of
§ 1546(a) that would not also be covered by the court's broad
53 Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 366.
54 Id.

55 Id.
56 There actually is a fifth paragraph in the statute, but it deals only with punishment for violating the offenses detailed in the previous four paragraphs.
57 18 USC § 1546(a) (emphasis added).
58 Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 363 n 16.
59 Id at 367.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 367.
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interpretation of paragraph one. It is possible that Congress intended to write duplicative paragraphs in § 1546(a), but the
majority provided no evidence to support such a position. This
gap in the Fourth Circuit's reasoning may have contributed to
Judge Williams's favorable influence on the subsequent Tenth
Circuit decision interpreting § 1546(a).
B.

The Tenth Circuit's Divergence: The Split Occurs

In a case with similar facts to those in Ryan-Webster, the
Tenth Circuit began its analysis of § 1546(a) by examining the
plain language of the statute. 63 The forged application documents
at issue in the case, according to Judge McConnell, author of the
unanimous opinion, were not documents prescribed for entry or
for evidence of authorized stay in the United States: "An alien
seeking to cross the border or to prove eligibility for employment
would get nowhere by flashing an ETA-750 [an Application for
Alien Employment]." 6 4 Judge McConnell reasoned that immigration application documents are no more documents for entry
than a credit card application is a credit card. 65 Citing the dissent in Ryan-Webster, the court found that application documents were nothing more than mere desires by the employer
that the alien obtain the ability to enter and work in the United
66
States.
The court also found that interpreting "other document" in
paragraph one of § 1546(a) to include application documents
makes paragraph four of the statute redundant. 67 Moreover, use
of the specific word "application" in paragraph four suggests that
Congress did distinguish between official entry documents and
68
the process for obtaining those entry documents.
The court rejected the government's argument that the congressional amendment to § 1546(a) following the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v Compos-Serrano broadened
the scope of the statute enough to reach application documents.
First, the court found that the congressional intent of this
amendment was irrelevant given the clear meaning of the statu-

63 Phillips,543 F3d at 1205.
64 Id at 1206.
65 Id.

Id.
67 Phillips,543 F3d at 1206.
68 See id at 1207.
66

374

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2010:

tory language. 69 Second, even supposing the congressional intent
was relevant, the court found that the "amended language is best
read to include all documents that can be used to legally enter
the country, even if the document's primary purpose is not to
70
facilitate entry."
II. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S
INTERPRETATION OF § 1546(A)
Congressional Intent Supporting a Narrow Construction of
§ 1546(a)

A.

1.

Pre-1986 arguments on the interpretation of § 1546(a).

The Fourth and Tenth Circuits' arguments concerning the
congressional intent of § 1546(a) lack historical mooring and inappropriately focus only on paragraph one of the statute. Both
courts look only to the 1986 amendment to paragraph one of the
statute. It is also important, though, to examine arguments regarding the statute's scope that occurred prior to this amendment. In United States v Vargas,7' the court considered whether
a foreign passport was a "document required for entry."72 The
defendant in the case was indicted for selling a Columbian passport to an undercover United States Customs agent. The court
began its analysis by noting that the Immigration Act of 1924
only criminalized actions relating to documents issued for entry
by appropriate officers of the United States. 73 The court then
found that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which
amended § 1546(a), only expanded the statute's reach to cover
documents equivalent to permits or visas-documents issued by
74
US officers in consulate offices outside the United States.
The Vargas court also distinguished between the "document
required for entry" language in paragraph one, two, and three of
the statute and the more inclusive language in paragraph four.
In paragraph four, the phrase "other document" was followed by
the phrase "required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder."7 5 The court found that this expansive lanId.
70 Id at 1207-08.
71 380 FSupp 1162 (EDNY 1974).
72 Id at 1163.
73 Id 1163-65.
69

74 Id at 1165.
75 Vargas, 380 F Supp at 1165.
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guage contrasted with the language of the preceding three paragraphs, and found that only paragraph four pertained to documents required to apply for an entry documentY6 The first three
paragraphs of the statute pertained to entry documents themselves, not documents required to apply for entry documents. The
court rejected the argument that the purpose of the immigration
statute required interpreting paragraph one broadly enough to
reach the defendant's conduct. Instead, the court found that
other statutes appropriately reached the defendant's actions, and
there was no discernable congressional intent that courts should
apply § 1546(a) to anything but actual entry documents.
Independent of the 1986 amendment, then, the Vargas court
identified a fundamental historical distinction between entry
documents and documents required to obtain entry documents. If
that distinction is carried through the 1986 amendment, paragraph one of § 1546(a) cannot reach application documents. The
modification of paragraph one's language from "document required for entry" to "document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry" only changes the relevant analysis from required
entry documents to permissible entry documents. The required/permissible distinction, however, does not expand the
scope of the statute to anything beyond entry documents. The
Ryan-Webster majority failed to recognize this historical distinction. As a result, the court read the statutory language of
§ 1546(a) without constraining the language to entry documents.
Application materials are not entry documents, and hence the
language of paragraph one of § 1546(a) cannot cover application
related misconduct.
2.

Congressional
intent manifested
amendment to § 1546(a).

by

the

1986

The language of the House Report on the amendment to
§ 1546(a) in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
supports the Tenth Circuit's reading of the statute. The report
found that the amendment "extend[ed] the criminal penalties for
fraud and misuse of immigration-related documents to include
border crossing cards, alien registration receipt cards, and other
documents issued as evidence of lawful entry or employment in
76 See id at 1166. This expansive language may seem to parallel the language of the
1986 amended statute, but this language is broader because it contains no reference to
entry documents. Also, the enumerated examples in the fourth paragraph already include
applications, so the expansiveness of the catchall phrase alone is unnecessary to the
Vargas court's distinction between paragraph one and paragraph four.
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the United States."77 Every court that cited this report relied on
it to support the proposition that the amendment was intended
78
to expand the scope of relevant documents under § 1546(a).
While this expansion is obvious given the inclusion of new
enumerated documents in the statute (like alien registration receipt cards), the catchall language in this report is not similarly
expansive.
The only "documents issued as evidence" of an alien's
immigration status are actual immigration documents, not immigration application documents. First, immigration application
documents are never issued to an alien. Rather, they are obtained without restriction and used by the prospective employer/
representing attorney on the alien's behalf. Second, only actual
immigration documents provide "evidence" of legal immigration
status. Application documents never provide evidence of "lawful
entry or employment." This report's language does not perfectly
track the language of the statute, but any evidence of congressional intent found in the report strongly suggests that paragraph one of § 1546(a) is aimed at preventing fraud or misuse of
actual immigration documents.
Another section of the House Report contains more ambiguous language: it states that the amendment to § 1546(a) was
meant to "bar the fraudulent use of certain documents to establish employment authorization." 79 Here, the language is of such
generality that it can be read as encompassing application documents as well as issued immigration documents. The legislative
comment below this section, however, undercuts this expansive
interpretation. The legislative comment states that "[e]mployer
sanctions will likely increase the manufacture and use of immigration documents for fraudulent purposes."8 0 The phrase "manufacture and use" implies the wholesale fraudulent creation of a
document. One does not "manufacture" an immigration application by disclosing false information within that application. One
does "manufacture" a Green Card when one creates a fake Green
Card rather than obtaining the authentic version from the
government. Consequently, the available evidence of congressional intent supports the Tenth Circuit's narrow reading of
the statute.
77
78
79
80

HR Rep No 99-682(I) at 94 (cited in note 46) (emphasis added).
See, for example, United States v Pool-Chan,453 F3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir 2006).
HR Rep No 99-682(I) at 111 (cited in note 46).
Id.
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Interpretive Canons: How the Ryan-Webster Majority's Plain
Reading Suffers by Ignoring Them

The Ryan-Webster majority never answered Judge
Williams's analysis based on an application of the interpretive
canon of ejusdem generis. Most likely, this was because the majority believed the statute was clear on its face, and hence considered it unnecessary to apply canons of statutory construction
to the text of the statute. Courts should ascertain whether a
statute is clear or ambiguous by examining the statute's language, the specific context of its language, and the broader context of the statutory whole.8 1 With reference to § 1546(a), the
specific context of "other document prescribed by statute or regulation" is the list of entry documents preceding this catchall
phrase. The canon of ejusdem generis provides a methodology for
examining that contextual language. The Ryan-Webster majority,
then, cannot claim statutory clarity to circumvent an application
of ejusdem generis when the clarity inquiry turns on an analysis
of specific contextual language. The court could analyze the
specific statutory context without an interpretive framework, but
such an approach would be mistaken if the interpretive canon
has any claim to legitimacy. If valid, the canon informs a contextual reading, ensuring that the reader properly evaluates the
relational nature of linguistic operators.
In response, a defender of the Ryan-Webster majority might
argue that interpretive canons are merely fallback tools of statutory construction. The Supreme Court has noted that the canons
are not "mandatory rules"; instead, they are tools to aid the judge
in divining congressional intent.8 2 The Court has further found
that the canons only apply in the face of statutory ambiguity.8 3
Even when applied, these interpretive principles must yield to
clear evidence of contrary congressional intent.8 4 Hence, given
the Ryan- Webster majority's finding of statutory clarity, the court
did not err in failing to evaluate Judge Williams' application of
the canons.
This response is question-begging, assuming linguistic clarity by employing a contextual reading the majority's argument
claims to avoid. A catchall phrase like "other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry" has no self-evident
81 Robinson v Shell Oil Co, 519 US 337, 341 (1997).
82 Chickasaw Nation v United States, 534 US 84, 94 (2001).
83 Garcia v United States, 469 US 70, 74-75 (1984).

84 Chickasaw Nation, 534 US at 94.
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meaning. The enumerated examples in the statute preceding this
catchall phrase denote actual documents issued by immigration
officials. Those enumerated examples do have clear meaning.
"Other document," on the other hand, fails to denote an actual
immigration document. If the phrase referred to an actual document, the statute could simply name that document. The phrase
may encompass application documents, or it may not. The ambiguity allows for the disagreement between the majority and
dissent in Ryan- Webster, and for the disagreement between the
Fourth and Tenth Circuits on the proper scope of § 1546(a).
"Other document" may have a clear contextual meaning, but it
cannot be clear by itself or the meaningful disagreement between
the circuits would be no debate at all.
Moreover, the fact that application of ejusdem generis yields
a different result than that obtained by the Ryan-Webster majority evidences the statute's ambiguity. The Supreme Court's admonition in Garcia v United States-to only apply ejusdem
generis when faced with statutory ambiguity 8 5 -seems puzzling.
Ambiguity exists when two readings are possible. An ejusdem
generis contextual reading of the statute that differs from a noncontextual reading seems to be an obvious instance of ambiguity.
As long as a contextual reading works no violence on the statute-which it certainly does not do here-it is groundless to resist that reading by asserting its irrelevance in light of the statute's clarity. To be sure, legislative history may demonstrate that
Congress intended to enact the non-contextual reading of the
statute, but that non-contextual reading alone cannot prevail
over the contextual one without a resort to some form of extratextual justification.
Other rationales for refusing to apply ejusdem generis are
also absent in this statute. The Supreme Court has declined to
apply the canon when the enumerated items preceding the
catchall phrase are insufficiently specific. 86 The enumerated examples in § 1546(a), however, are sufficiently specific; they refer
to concrete, existent documents. The Court has also refused to
apply the canon when commonalities are not derivable from the
enumerated examples, or when it is unclear which commonality
is relevant to the catchall provision.8 7 The Ryan-Webster dissent
identified three commonalities in the statute. As for their
85 Garcia,469 US at

74-75.

86 See Ali v FederalBureau of Prisons,552 US 214, 225 (2008).
87 Id.
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relevancy, each commonality excludes application documents
from the statute's scope, so there is no difficulty in discerning
which limiting principle should receive effect. Finally, the Court
has refused to limit the catchall phrase through the enumerated
examples when the language in the catchall provision was sufficiently broad.8 8 Here, the catchall phrase is broad, but it does not
use the word "any." Whether the phrase "any other document
prescribed by statute" would be broader than the actual language
of "other document prescribed by statute" is debatable, but the
Supreme Court has held that there is a meaningful expansion in
meaning when the legislature uses the word "any."8 9 Thus,
§ 1546(a) contains none of the linguistic sequences that justify a
refusal to apply the canon of ejusdem generis.
C.

Rule of Lenity

The Ryan- Webster and Phillips courts both claimed that the
plain language of § 1546(a) supports their position. Because the
respective courts' positions contradict each other, one must
necessarily be in error. Both courts made valid arguments (see
Section I.A and B) and neither seems to have been plainly mistaken, therefore their contradictory interpretations of the plain
language suggest the statute's textual ambiguity. Perhaps "other
document prescribed by statute or regulation" is ambiguous because it does not clearly include or exclude the application documents at issue in these cases.
If the language is ambiguous, resorting to the legislative history is in order. Yet, that history is largely indeterminate. It may
be clear that the 1986 amendment expanded the scope of
§ 1546(a), but this expansion does not necessarily mean that the
statute covers application-related misconduct.
There may be good reasons to construe the ambiguity
against the government in these cases. Paragraph four of
§ 1546(a) clearly reaches the defendants' conduct in RyanWebster and Phillips. Apart from the superfluity/redundancy argument for interpreting paragraph one narrowly, there may be
an argument for using the rule of lenity when there is no danger
that the defendant's crime will go unpunished. For whatever reason, the prosecution did not charge the defendants under
88 Id at 227 (finding "the unmodified, all-encompassing phrase 'any other law
enforcement officer' indicated an intent not to limit the catchall provision with the
characteristic of the preceding examples).
89 Id at 219.

380

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2010:

paragraph four in Phillips.90 Despite this prosecutorial slip, the
court still affirmed the Phillips defendants' conviction under 18
USC § 1001, which criminalizes the knowing and willful making
and using of a false writing and document to the Department of
Labor. 91 Among other counts, Ryan-Webster was convicted, and
did not appeal her conviction, under paragraph four of
92
§ 1546(a).
The Ryan-Webster majority rejected the argument that the
appropriateness of paragraph four of § 1546(a) casts doubt on the
court's interpretation of paragraph one of the statute. The court
held that the issue was not whether one statute was a "better fit"
than another; the only relevant consideration was whether the
first paragraph provided "a proper statutory basis for [the]
charges." 93 The court was correct in an absolute sense, but of
course the majority held that the statute was unambiguous. If
paragraph one is ambiguous as to application documents but not
as to actual entry documents, and paragraph four is unambiguous as to application documents, the rule of lenity may be
appropriate to provide for the clearest application of law to facts.
The rule of lenity, one might counter, is designed to ensure
that the defendant was put on fair notice regarding the criminality of his or her conduct. 94 In these cases, paragraph four of
§ 1546(a) provided that fair notice. Accordingly, there is little
reason to fear applying an ambiguous statute to a defendant's
conduct when that defendant's conduct was in clear violation of a
separate law. The defendant, however, could counter by arguing
that she would not have committed the illegal act if she had
known it was a violation of paragraph one as well as paragraph
four. Each violation of § 1546(a) counts as a separate felony, so
the potential for dual liability under separate paragraphs of the
statute equals the potential for doubled prison time. Therefore,
if it is important to provide fair notice with respect to the content
of a given crime, it is also important to provide such notice
with respect to the number of violations a given offense could
constitute.
Even if one rejects this fair notice argument for the rule of
lenity, this does not entail the conclusion that its application is
inappropriate here. The justice system's legitimacy, in part,
90
91
92
93
94

See Phillips, 543 F3d at 1206.
Id at 1200, 1211.
Ryan-Webster, 353 F3d at 357.
Id at 362.
See, for example, US v Kozminski, 487 US 931, 952 (1988).
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depends on applying statutes that clearly criminalize a defendant's conduct. A defendant may believe that a particular statute
is unjust, but justification for such a belief is weakened from a
public legitimacy perspective since that statute was promulgated
through the democratic process. When a judge construes an ambiguous statute to cover a defendant's conduct, especially when
another statute demonstrates that the democratic process was
capable of clearly criminalizing the defendant's conduct, the
legitimacy of the justice system is damaged. Federal criminal
laws abound. These laws circumscribe vast areas of human conduct. If the enterprising prosecutor's indictment power is to remain limited, courts should shut down attempts to prosecute
defendants under ambiguous statutes when the prosecutor fails
to indict under a statute that does precisely cover the conduct
at issue.
CONCLUSION

The interpretive split between the Fourth and Tenth Circuits is not only interesting because of the impact it has on criminal defendants, but also because it highlights fundamental difficulties in the law regarding the use of interpretive canons, the
role of legislative history in discerning congressional intent, and
the appropriate application of the rule of lenity. While this
Comment's advocacy of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of
§ 1546(a) on interpretive methods and rule of lenity grounds may
be tendentious, what little legislative history is available also
supports the Tenth Circuit's position. Even though the Supreme
Court is unlikely to resolve this dispute soon, as evidenced by its
rejection of the Phillips certiorari petition, 95 future circuits that
address the divide should side with the Tenth Circuit's view of
the statute.

95 Phillips v US, 129 S Ct 946 (2009) (cert denied).

